Europe in 2025
The year ahead will be perilous for Emmanuel Macron’s government
November 20, 2024
France is heading for a bumpy 2025. Michel Barnier, the new conservative prime minister, runs a precarious minority coalition. If he can impose a steady hand, he may last the year. But he is up against aggrieved opposition on both the left and right. Divided, these two blocs can merely block his legislative plans. Together, they could bring down his government. By the summer, French voters could be returning to the ballot box again.
Mr Barnier needs to keep his coalition of right-wingers and centrists loyal to President Emmanuel Macron together, while keeping the opposition split. The left will be consistently hostile. This means that, to pass legislation, he will need tacit approval from Marine Le Pen. The hard-right leader will seek to appear responsible but, in effect, the government’s survival will be in her hands.
This will give her a lot of clout. She will push for the introduction of proportional representation for parliamentary elections. The conservative interior minister, Bruno Retailleau, will demand tougher policy on immigration and policing, dismaying left-leaning coalition centrists. Differences in the coalition will be sharpened by the race to succeed Mr Macron at the next presidential election, due in 2027.
A big source of tension will be fixing the dreadful public finances. France’s efforts to curb the budget deficit to 5% of GDP in 2025, still well above the eu’s 3% limit, will be closely watched by Brussels and financial markets. Big business and the rich will face extra taxes. Mr Barnier’s promised spending cuts will meet resistance, in parliament and on the streets.
For the president, the coming year will be uncomfortable. Used to micromanaging policy, Mr Macron will have to learn to delegate. In 2024 he lost European and then legislative elections, after calling a snap parliamentary election. Power will slip increasingly from the Elysée Palace to the prime minister’s mansion, Matignon. The constitution bars Mr Macron from dissolving parliament again until July 2025. Even then, fresh elections would not resolve the problem of a split parliament. Political deadlock will intensify calls for Mr Macron himself to step down and hold an early presidential election.
Increasingly detached, Mr Macron will shift his attention abroad. This could play to his strengths, as he pushes for greater European strategic autonomy and maintains his hawkish support for Ukraine and its potential membership of the eu and nato. But the president’s authority abroad will be damaged by weakness at home. Mr Macron’s best hope will be that the coalition government beds down and shields him from French grievances. If not, he will be blamed for a year that could bring more political instability than he has bargained for. ■