Trump v Iran: a negotiation made in hell

ABBAS ARAGHCHI is no stranger to the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva. He spent time there in 2013 working to negotiate an interim deal that froze parts of Iran’s nuclear programme. It paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a more detailed agreement signed two years later. The latter was supposed to eliminate both the threat of an Iranian bomb and the threat of Israel attacking Iran. It did neither, because Donald Trump withdrew from the pact in 2018.

When Mr Araghchi returned to the Intercontinental on June 20th, it was as a wartime foreign minister. Israel is now in its second week of a wide-ranging campaign of air strikes in Iran. It has assassinated the army leadership and struck at Iran’s nuclear facilities; its air force flies freely over Tehran, the capital. Desperate for a deal that might end the war, Mr Araghchi met with his counterparts from Britain, France, Germany and the EU.

There is a window for a diplomatic solution. Israel wants America to join the war and strike Fordow, a deeply buried nuclear facility that its own bombs will struggle to reach. Mr Trump is considering it. But on June 19th Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the president was willing to talk first. He would decide “whether or not to go within the next two weeks”.

The decision may come sooner, though: Mr Trump is unlikely to tolerate two weeks of unproductive talks. Arab officials have told Iran that it must do two things if it wants a deal. One is to negotiate directly with America; the other is to come prepared to make major concessions around its uranium-enrichment programme. So far, though, Iran seems unwilling to do either.

Before the war Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s envoy, held five meetings with Mr Araghchi to discuss a new nuclear deal. At first it seemed as if America would pursue an agreement similar to the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to refine uranium to 3.67% purity. That could be used to manufacture fuel for nuclear reactors but was a far cry from the 90% needed to fashion a nuclear bomb. The deal also capped both the quantity and quality of Iran’s centrifuges, the devices used to enrich uranium. Such restrictions were meant to buy time. Even if Iran decided to violate the deal, it would have needed around one year to produce a bomb’s worth of fissile material.

But a revived JCPOA could not restore such a long “breakout time”. Iran has spent the past few years mastering the nuclear-fuel cycle. It has enriched uranium to 60% purity, a short hop from weapons-grade; it has produced more and better centrifuges, and may have stashed some of its highly enriched uranium at secret facilities. The old deal is no longer on the table.

America is now insisting on a zero-enrichment deal, in which Iran forswears any capacity to refine uranium. If Iran is willing to concede, America may well force Israel to end its war. On June 17th the Trump administration proposed a new round of negotiations between Messrs Araghchi and Witkoff. There were suggestions that J.D. Vance, the vice-president, might attend as well, to demonstrate that the talks were serious.

But in public Iran rejected the idea of talking directly with America. The summit in Geneva seems to be a compromise. European countries had been frozen out of the talks earlier this year: neither America nor Iran wanted to include them. Now they are useful intermediaries.

Still, even if America did not attend the talks, it was there in spirit. David Lammy, the British foreign secretary, was in Washington the day before the Geneva summit. He met Marco Rubio, his American counterpart, and Mr Witkoff. The Americans said they wanted to talk directly with Iran. And the Europeans, for their part, seem to be moving closer to America’s position. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, now says he wants a deal that “move[s] to zero enrichment”. German diplomats make similar comments. If Iran thought Europe would be more flexible than America, it may be disappointed.

Mr Trump has many reasons to hesitate about bombing Iran. It would be unpopular, for a start: 60% of Americans oppose getting involved in the war, with just 16% in favour, according to a poll from The Economist and YouGov. It would be particularly divisive within Mr Trump’s MAGA coalition. It also may not work: some American and allied military officers doubt that even the enormous GBU-57, America’s largest “bunker-buster” bomb, could penetrate deeply enough to destroy Fordow.

He and his aides are also fielding frantic calls from America’s allies in the Gulf. Officials in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fear that American strikes could trigger Iranian retaliation against their country—and an exodus of rich expats. Khalaf al-Habtoor, a prominent Emirati businessman, warned in a social-media post that “the region faces a real strategic danger”. Bankers and consultants are fretting about the risk of nuclear fallout (a remote concern). All of this is deeply unnerving for a part of the Middle East that prides itself on being an oasis of stability.

Iran is eager for a deal too. It has asked Cyprus, Oman, Qatar and the UAE to pass messages to America and Israel. There have also been several calls between Messrs Araghchi and Witkoff. So far, though, they seem to be talking past one another: diplomats in the region say Iran is still unwilling to concede on enrichment.

Stubbornness was a viable strategy a decade ago, during the talks over the JCPOA. Barack Obama, the president at the time, gave up on his demands for a zero-enrichment deal when he realised Iran would not budge. It is less effective today, with Israeli jets roaring over Tehran—and America threatening to join them. ■