Xi Jinping’s purge should worry the world

“IN AN UNCERTAIN world, China is the biggest certainty.” So proclaimed a Chinese spokesman in December. Amid a war in Europe, turmoil in the Middle East and America’s rewriting of the geopolitical order, some in the West may be inclined to agree. As The Economist went to press, Britain’s prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, was visiting China’s president, Xi Jinping, the latest among a series of Western leaders who have headed to Beijing in search of deals and dependability.

Yet in recent days politics in China has proved anything but certain. On January 24th the defence ministry said that the most senior uniformed officer, Zhang Youxia, and another top general, Liu Zhenli, were under investigation for violating discipline. Not since 1971 has there been such a purge at the apex of China’s armed forces. That was when the heir-apparent to Mao Zedong, the defence minister, Lin Biao, died in a plane crash after an alleged coup attempt against the chairman.

The purge at the top of the 2m-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has come along with a huge increase in actions against party members and officials. Although China’s politics is a black box, the signs are that this is a measure of Mr Xi’s total command over the Communist Party. The question left for the outside world is what the purge means for China’s readiness to launch an invasion of Taiwan.

In 2025 Chinese authorities investigated over 1m people for corruption and deviant politics, 60% more than two years earlier and the most since Mr Xi came to power in 2012. Most of these purges are not the result of a power struggle, but a consequence of how the Communist Party disciplines itself. Above the law and without any scrutiny from a free press, the party has instead to depend on its own internal police to keep cadres on the straight and narrow.

In October, when senior officials met in Beijing, 37 of the 205 full-time members of the Central Committee were missing, presumed under investigation. However, the purge also reaches down into the lower ranks, terrorising party members, forcing mistrustful cadres into close personal networks where they feel safe, and paralysing some of those who favour reform.

The effect on the PLA is particularly potent. The army’s newspaper vaguely linked the toppling of the two generals to the war on corruption. But it also, in essence, accused them of insubordination towards Mr Xi. Calling the two officers’ influence “extremely vile”, it said they had caused “immense damage” to the “political ecology” of the PLA as well as to the building of its “combat capability”.

If the generals’ downfall did that to the PLA you might conclude the West should celebrate. Chinese forces are a growing threat. The navy is now bigger than America’s. The Pentagon reckons it plans six more aircraft-carriers by 2035, giving it nine compared with America’s 11. China’s nuclear arsenal is expected to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030 on missiles, submarines and planes—fewer than America and Russia, but double its stockpile in 2023.

In fact, the consequences of the purge are more complicated. A Pentagon report in December suggested that in the short run Mr Xi’s campaign could disrupt the operational effectiveness of the PLA, whereas in the longer term cleaning up the army could make it more proficient. However, the graver risk is one that the Pentagon passed over. This is the hollowing out of the team that would advise Mr Xi if a military crisis occurs, especially one over Taiwan.

American officials believe that China’s president has ordered the PLA to be able to take Taiwan by 2027. Some suspect that the island could not defend itself for long without outside help. Although America supplies arms to Taiwan, including a record $11.1bn package agreed on in December, it might not help repel an invasion—no treaty requires it to do so. Fears of China’s military prowess are causing some leading Taiwanese politicians to wonder whether pouring money into building up the island’s defences is worthwhile.

The seas around China are fraught. The country contests islands with Japan in the East China Sea. Several countries jockey with it over territory in the South China Sea. The Taiwan Strait is a perennial flashpoint. China is staging ever more shows of force in the area. American aircraft and warships patrol these waters; other Western countries sometimes join them. Western officials accuse Chinese forces of deliberately taking risks close to these patrols. Following a mishap, cool military heads would be needed to prevent escalation. To whom would he turn?

One such person was General Zhang. He was a rarity among China’s top brass, with experience of the horrors of fighting a war, against Vietnam. Western analysts believe that he could stand up to Mr Xi. Family connections between the two men date back to the party’s guerrilla days before it seized power in 1949.

Now that he and General Liu have gone, the Central Military Commission, the PLA’s high command, is thin. Since 2022 China’s president has ejected five of its six uniformed officers. The only two people left are Mr Xi himself, who heads it, and a political commissar in charge of fighting graft, who has little experience of military operations.

Imagine that Mr Xi appoints yes-men to fill the empty slots. Would his pliant new advisers be willing to tell him that, even with all its new hardware, China would still face enormous risks were it to mount an invasion of Taiwan?

To be sure, Mr Xi himself must be aware of the potential costs. He will have studied Russia’s disastrous campaign in Ukraine. He has heard from Western leaders how an attack on Taiwan would harm China’s economy.

However, although Chinese politics is more than capable of packing surprises, few analysts doubt that the 72-year-old Mr Xi will use a party conference next year to underline that he intends to prolong his rule, and that he prizes obedience at all levels of the party. In an uncertain world, such a certainty offers no solace at all. ■