Ambush averted
How to avoid an unjust peace in Ukraine
November 28, 2025
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HAS UKRAINE’S moment of maximum diplomatic danger passed? It looks that way, at least for now. A week after the leak of a 28-point surrender plan, America’s secretary of state, Senate Republicans and European leaders have managed to get a hand on the controls. They will seek to protect Ukraine in talks—though, this being Trumpland, nobody can be sure that they will be able to scotch the plan’s most harmful elements. And even if they succeed, the choices confronting Ukraine and its backers in Europe are only going to get harder.
The original plan pretended to be about peace, but in reality paved the way to the next war by hampering Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, rewarding Vladimir Putin’s aggression and setting up sanctions relief and investment that would provide Russia with the cash to rearm. The plan promised to meet a future Russian attack with “a decisive co-ordinated military response”, but there were no details and the prospect of Donald Trump—or any American president—going head to head with nuclear-armed Russia over Ukraine is not credible.
Talks continue. Encouragingly, the Americans have relaxed a deadline of Thanksgiving and backed away from a reported threat to deprive Ukraine of American intelligence and weapons if Volodymyr Zelensky does not sign a deal. Mr Zelensky and his European allies have also won some concessions. But much remains to be negotiated, and each step towards an agreement that could offer Ukraine the foundation of a secure future will, for that very reason, provoke fresh objections from Russia. If no plan can be contrived that is acceptable to both sides, even under American pressure, then the fighting will continue.
How then will the war end? This newspaper has long argued that for Ukraine success means emerging as a thriving, Western-leaning democracy. Yet each of those things is increasingly in doubt. To thrive, Ukraine needs capital and people to return. But if Russia is likely to attack again, capital and people will flee. To be Westward-leaning, Ukraine must be bound into European political, economic and defence networks. But if America imposes an unjust peace and Europe cannot protect their country, Ukrainians will feel betrayed. To be a healthy democracy, Ukraine’s politicians must provide leadership. However, the 28-point plan was leaked as a vast corruption scandal rocked the increasingly centralised and unpopular government of Mr Zelensky.
Yet, despite what some around Mr Trump insist, defeat is not inevitable. Saying it is only hastens it. Mr Putin is paying a terrible price for each metre of Ukrainian soil. The Russian economy can sustain the war, but is under pressure. Money is getting tighter. Without big cuts in output, oil prices, which averaged just above $80 a barrel in 2023 and 2024, are forecast to fall into the $50s next year and reach the $30s by the end of 2027. Polling suggests that most ordinary Russians try not to think about the war. Given that they are not fired up by patriotic fervour, how much suffering will it take to alert them to the waste of Russian lives and treasure?
The rub is that, in this war of attrition, Ukraine lacks men and weapons—Russia is making more drones and can breach its air defences. Europe, with an economy ten times bigger than Russia’s, could help solve this by a generous, multi-year commitment of money. Its leaders understand the threat, but cannot seem to turn words into actions. Just last month the European Union failed to agree on a plan to seize €140bn ($160bn) of Russian assets. If Europe continues to work on Brussels time, help will come too late to save Ukraine. ■
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