Ukraine smashes Russia’s air force and a key bridge

RARELY HAS a week of war seemed so confusing. In a few early June days, underlying assumptions about Ukraine and Russia were shaken in three ways. On June 1st Ukraine launched one of the most daring raids in the modern history of warfare, releasing killer drones from trucks to scavenge on strategic bombers deep inside Russia, reimagining old types of sabotage and exposing Russia’s vulnerabilities. Two days later Ukraine struck the bridge linking occupied Crimea to the Russian mainland. In between, there were peace talks in Istanbul that were not really talks: Russia doubled down with its ultimatums, but lines of communication were opened. On the war front, meanwhile, Russia continued to press Ukraine hard, while bleeding hard too, suffering perhaps its millionth casualty. In a telephone call to Donald Trump on June 4th, Vladimir Putin promised retaliation.

The operation the Ukrainians codenamed “Spider Web” was 18 months in the making. In scale, audacity and timing, it played out like an orchestra. The attack focused on at least four air bases, the farthest over 4,000 km from Kyiv. They used over 100 quadcopters that emerged almost simultaneously from hidden compartments inside trucks, which then self-destructed. Ukraine’s main intelligence agency, the SBU, which led the operation, claimed to have damaged or destroyed at least 41 aircraft, including nuclear-capable bombers and early-warning planes. Satellite images suggest fewer were destroyed, but with over 13 confirmed losses, it was a spectacular blow to Russian capabilities—and pride.

Ukrainian intelligence sources said they hoped the operation would sow doubt in the Kremlin that it could sustain a full-scale war. “The longer this drags on, the more Pandora’s boxes we’ll be forced to open,” one said. A key outcome was proof that Ukrainian intelligence was still able to operate with extreme secrecy, despite fears of Russian penetration. Russia had no warning of the attack.

The June 3rd attack on the Kerch bridge would have led most other weeks’ news. Ukraine claims the strike, probably conducted by underwater drones, seriously damaged the bridge’s foundations. That seems unlikely, given the flow of traffic that resumed a few hours later. But even if the physical damage was limited, the psychological effect was large enough. Ukraine even hacked the bridge’s own CCTV to show the hit taking place.

But a larger question hangs over botched sabotage operations in Russia’s border regions in the early hours of June 1st. Two Ukrainian sources say the goal had been to derail a munitions train headed for the front; instead, a passenger train crashed, killing at least seven people. Russian media splashed on the tragedy, while leaving attacks on its airbases unreported.

Russia’s delegation arrived in Istanbul on June 2nd with a similarly disciplined line. In curt exchanges that lasted slightly over an hour, they referred to the operations on their soil only once—dismissing them as “terrorism”. They handed over a “memorandum” effectively demanding Ukraine’s surrender: concessions on sovereignty, neutrality and military capabilities. Ukraine countered with a list of hundreds of children taken from occupied areas. The Russians called that a “show for childless, bleeding-heart European old ladies”.

At the same time, traces of a diplomatic track remained. The sides agreed to resume prisoner swaps, including all-for-all exchanges of the young and infirm. Some messages may have been passed from the Kremlin in secret. Even so, a Ukrainian security official warned that the window for diplomacy was closing. A full ceasefire before the end of Russia’s summer offensive, only just now getting under way, now seems unlikely. “The Russians are stalling,” said Heorhii Tykhyi, spokesman for Ukraine’s foreign ministry. “They’re too confident. They’re too arrogant.”

That confidence stems partly from Russian progress on the front lines, but it is coming steadily if at high cost. Russia is pressing in two main directions: against Sumy in the north-east, reversing Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk across the border; and at the Donetsk region, Russia’s main focus since 2014. However much Ukraine celebrates its new raiding prowess deep inside Russia, the victory has little immediate relevance to the front lines. For now, this aspect of the war remains its most difficult—and its most dangerous. ■