There is nothing extreme about the Baltic states’ hard-nosed view of Russia, says Latvia’s foreign minister

THOSE OF US living around the Baltic Sea, more than in any other European countries, have the most to gain from a friendly and stable Russia. We also have the most to lose if decision-makers are misled by the illusory prospect of detente with the Kremlin. This is no time for wishful thinking.

The Economist’s reporting on our region’s security has long been a journalistic lodestar, which is why many of us living around the Baltic Sea were disappointed to read in these pages that our view of Russia is “extreme”. It is realistic and evidence-based.

Today many admit that we in the Baltics were right in warning about Russia’s trajectory towards militarism and autocracy, and about its imperialist objectives. Russian imperialism has deep roots. It predates Vladimir Putin—and will most likely outlast him. That is not an “incurable” belief. It is prudence.

Our most important message is that Russia is not just Ukraine’s problem. It threatens the international order. Mr Putin’s ambitions stretch far beyond Ukraine. He dreams of spheres of influence and dominance beyond Russia’s borders. He seeks to divide America and Europe to split NATO. He is deepening the “no-limits” partnership with China. He is working closely with rogue states including Iran and North Korea, and ruthlessly exploiting Africa’s natural resources via his Africa Corps.

Nothing suggests that Russia is ready for peace in Ukraine. Despite Mr Putin’s “three-day campaign” turning into a three-year catastrophe, his war machine is still running. Any weakness only encourages him to continue with his aggression and seek at the negotiating table what he has failed to achieve on the battlefield.

Mr Putin is now following step-by-step Russia’s well-worn negotiations manual: issue absurd maximalist demands and blame the other party for not accepting them; concede nothing; continuously delay the process; reset expectations; wait for others to present compromises or concessions; and exploit this as weakness.

Meanwhile, Russia continues—and indeed is escalating—its missile and drone onslaught against civilian targets in Ukrainian cities; this may intensify further after Ukraine’s brilliant, sophisticated drone operation inside Russia on June 1st. The Kremlin is also stepping up its non-conventional attacks against European countries, including cyber-attacks, disinformation operations, sabotage of critical infrastructure and election interference. All these methods have been tested and honed across the continent over decades. We in the Baltics did warn about taking them seriously. Now we all see the consequences of not pushing back.

Against this backdrop, Latvia sees a clear path towards a durable peace in Ukraine that rests on three pillars: strengthening our national and NATO’s collective defence; weakening Russia’s capacity to wage war; and sustaining Ukraine’s ability to defend itself diplomatically, militarily and economically.

Rapidly increasing investment in hard deterrence and defence capabilities is a must. NATO allies should aim to raise defence and defence-related spending to 5% of GDP. We must focus on aligning military, intelligence and internal-security resources to respond to Russia’s non-conventional attacks, overcoming irritants in transatlantic relations, and (belatedly) achieving full European Union energy independence from Russia.

This requires political will. The Baltic states show what is possible. We and Poland will spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2026. This year we have achieved total energy independence from Russia, having previously relied on it for most of our natural gas.

Mr Putin will not stop until someone stops him. Our first step should be to intensify financial warfare. The Graham-Blumental sanctions proposed in America’s Congress, which include a potential 500% tariff on countries that buy Russian fossil fuels, would blow a hole in Russia’s budget—especially if accompanied by powerful new EU sanctions. Oil and gas exports remain Russia’s fiscal lifeline, accounting for a third of federal revenue. Increasingly, these exports are shipped via the Baltic Sea using a shadow fleet designed to dodge sanctions. We can also do more to restrict Russia’s access to technology and to deter its international enablers with “secondary” sanctions on those who trade with it.

This maximum-pressure approach represents the only viable path to peace. We must deprive the Kremlin of its income through tariffs on energy imports, financial restrictions and by lowering the oil price. It is an approach grounded in realism because as long as Russia is ruled by this regime, it will be geared towards war. Russia is clearly rearming and preparing for long-term confrontation with the West, and we must prepare accordingly.

Latvia’s own history shows how peace can be achieved through strength. We established our republic in 1918 and secured it through the war of independence. The peace treaty with Soviet Russia in 1920 was signed after the Russians had been pushed back and as the West stood united. Yet this unity splintered under economic upheaval, transatlantic disengagement and the failure of the League of Nations. Poland, the Baltic states and Finland fell victim to Hitler’s and Stalin’s aggression. Once we won back our independence, after half a century of Soviet occupation, securing the withdrawal of Russian troops became possible thanks to Western pressure and negotiations from a position of strength.

With these lessons in mind, we must abandon once and for all illusions of detente, or peace achieved through appeasement. As The Economist’s own editorials have repeatedly warned, anything less than visible, credible strength and unity risks repeating the mistakes of history and inviting the next war. We in the West have all the necessary instruments to prevent it from happening. It would not cost much, compared with the alternatives. ■