This India-Pakistan showdown is dangerously different

IT IS 18 days since a terrorist assault in India-controlled Kashmir and the mounting confrontation between India and Pakistan now involves the most intense fighting between them for 25 years. This crisis looks very different from previous ones. The two sides are striking military airbases and major cities far beyond Kashmir. Their fighting involves cutting-edge technology from missiles and Israeli drones to Chinese warplanes that make it a laboratory for weaponry. India seems determined to establish “escalatory dominance” over its smaller adversary. And now the first signs of a nuclear stand-off are emerging.

Pakistan said on May 10th that it was firing Fateh-1 missiles at military targets in India after Indian missiles targeted three Pakistani air-force bases overnight, including one near its military headquarters. This was the first time since the fighting began that either side claimed to have used surface-to-surface missiles, a significant escalation as some (though not the Fateh-1) can carry nuclear warheads. Pakistan’s state broadcasters said the prime minister had called a meeting of the National Command Authority, which controls its nuclear arsenal. But Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, later denied that the meeting was scheduled.

India accused Pakistan of multiple overnight attacks on military and civilian sites using high-speed missiles, drones and fighter jets. It reported limited damage at four Indian air-force bases. In response, India said it used air-to-surface missiles and other weapons to hit Pakistani military targets including command centres and radar installations. India also said that Pakistani troops were moving towards forward areas, indicating an intent to escalate further. Yet both sides said they would not escalate further if the other reciprocated.

A day earlier, India said it had used armed drones to retaliate for incursions by 300-400 Pakistani drones. Pakistan said it had shot down 77 Indian drones, accusing India of pushing the two countries’ to the brink of a full-scale war. Meanwhile, heavy artillery fire continues across the disputed border that divides Kashmir.

If crises between India and Pakistan seem sadly familiar to the outside world, this one is entering perilous new territory. The two sides have broken away from the pattern they roughly followed during their two previous standoffs, which were both triggered by terrorist attacks in Kashmir. In 2016, when India sent special forces a short distance into Pakistani-administered Kashmir, Pakistan said nothing had happened and did not retaliate. In 2019, the two sides conducted quick tit-for-tat air strikes of limited impact. This time India has established a new precedent by retaliating for Pakistan’s alleged counter-strikes (as well as for the original terrorist attack).

India seems intent on proving to Pakistan that it has the ability and readiness to respond to any further attack with a more damaging one. That makes it harder for Pakistan to find an off-ramp similar to the token air strike it carried out in 2019: an attack that would satisfy domestic audiences without triggering further Indian action. One risk of that approach is that it pushes Pakistan—the weaker power with more vulnerable territory—to resort faster to nuclear signalling, as it did during a crisis in 1990 and in the 1999 conflict, which came a year after the two sides openly tested their nuclear weapons. Pakistani military officials sent the original notice to reporters about the National Command Authority meeting, describing it as a signal that Pakistan would not be coerced. “If red lines are crossed, Pakistan retains the full spectrum of response options,” the notice said. “Deterrence works only when the adversary knows the cost.”

The battlefield is wider than it has been in five decades. In 2019 India’s air strikes targeted the part of Kashmir that Pakistan controls and some sites just inside Pakistan proper. This time its initial air raid hit targets deep within Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, as well as its most politically and economically important one. Both sides appear to be targeting areas outside Kashmir for the first time since their last full-scale war in 1971. Even the 1999 conflict was confined to a relatively small part of the Line of Control.

“It looks like we are in a classic escalatory situation—each side wants to show that it can up the ante and demonstrate resolve,” says Srinath Raghavan of India’s Ashoka University. “If we don’t want to give an exit to the other side and are determined to demonstrate escalation dominance, then things could go awry pretty quickly.” He adds that this crisis, like previous wars between the two sides, might need significant foreign involvement to bring it to an end.

But it is unclear which foreign power can play a mediating role. China is too close to Pakistan. Britain and the European Union have limited influence in South Asia. And America seems not to want to get involved. Its Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, spoke on May 9th with Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, urging both sides to de-escalate and offering American help. But a day earlier, America’s vice president, J.D. Vance, said: “We’re not going to get involved in the middle of a war that’s fundamentally none of our business.”

The confrontation is made all the more dangerous by the advanced weaponry involved. India has deployed its newest Rafale fighter jets (from France), Harop “kamikaze” drones (from Israel) and a state-of-the-art S-400 air defence system (from Russia). Pakistan has long had American F-16 fighters but is now fielding new Chinese J-10C fighters equipped with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, which it claims shot down some of India’s Rafales. It also has aerial attack drones from China and Turkey. (India says it suspects that the drones used on the evening of May 8th are Asisguard Songar drones from Turkey.)

Armed drones, in particular, create a new dynamic. They allow each side to conduct attacks that are more alarming and impactful than artillery fire, but not as drastic as missile or air strikes. In theory, they can reduce the risk of unintended civilian casualties. But they also allow each side to attempt bolder attacks, including on residential areas. And they confuse the escalatory calculus, often coming in waves rather than big discrete attacks, which makes it harder for each side to assess when a strike has stopped or started and who has the upper hand.

Moreover, the information environment has changed since the countries’ last major military standoff. AI-generation of images has made disinformation much easier to create and share. AI tools are making it easier to quickly censor large amounts of information online, too. Misreporting by Indian media was rampant on the night of May 8th: some outlets falsely claimed that there had been a coup in Pakistan; that Indian forces had captured its capital; and that the Indian navy had attacked the port of Karachi. Karachi port later accused India of hacking its social-media account to publish messages falsely saying it had been damaged by an Indian strike.

There are some encouraging signs. The two sides appear to have established a new channel of communication between their national security advisers, although for now that may be taking place only through an intermediary. Both are now claiming successful strikes on high-value targets, potentially allowing them to begin de-escalating. But if they continue to ramp up military action, this could quickly spiral out of control. ■