Can Japan compensate for America’s tin-eared Asian diplomacy?

It is a source of quiet pride to its people that Japan was the only Asian country present at the formation of the g7 in the 1970s. Japan’s induction was a confirmation that the West should properly be defined not by North Atlantic geography but by a commitment to liberal democratic ideas and international norms.

This year the notion that there is such a thing as a “global West” has come sharply into relief, due to its antithesis, represented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and by China’s illiberalism at home and abroad, not least in its military threats to Taiwan. In this new global West, which denounces Russian aggression and deplores China’s growing assertiveness, Asian representatives include not just Japan but also Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

Yet by population size they represent a small Asian minority. It is equally striking that illiberal Asian countries rarely criticise China or Russia and sometimes openly admire them. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam are among those countries. And it seems many of their citizens feel similarly. For all the talk by America and its friends of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, an arc of illiberalism shadows it.

There are many explanations for this. China’s authoritarian modernisation has a powerful allure for poor Asian countries. The appeal of the Asian strongman claiming to engender development and national pride (even while fleecing the state) endures. America, the self-proclaimed leader of the free world, is loud and hectoring. It bangs on about democracy and human rights while starting wars. It offers few economic or trade enticements. President Joe Biden’s measly-looking Indo-Pacific Economic Framework faces scepticism for that reason. When it comes to outflanking its adversaries in Asia, one Western official concedes that “America sucks.”

This is where Japan comes in, to judge by Banyan’s recent conversations with policymakers in Tokyo. Japan, they say, is able to reach parts of Asia that American diplomacy cannot. In building trust with the global south, they argue, it helps that Japan is no evangelist for democracy. The country has been untainted by war-making since 1945. And Japanese ties run deep into the establishments of South-East Asia and beyond.

Japan also has money to offer, if not as much as China. Among the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations, Japan is the biggest donor and a major source of fdi. Japan’s approach to much-needed infrastructure is also fundamentally different to China’s.

Chinese projects, which typically focus on countries rich in resources that China needs, are self-serving. They employ large numbers of Chinese workers rather than locals. Their accounting is opaque and tends to overlook countries’ ability to pay back debts. By contrast, the Japanese approach emphasises transparency. And, says an official, “We offer co-operation without an expectation of getting anything [direct] in return.” China’s lending has generated mounting resentment even in countries that are among its closest partners, such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Some of the Japanese arguments may also be self-serving. And yet criticism in Asia about the Japanese presence is almost never heard.

Meanwhile, his advisers suggest, Kishida Fumio, the prime minister, is convinced of the geopolitical as well as environmental benefits of using Japanese expertise to help poorer Asian countries shift, in parallel with Japan itself, to renewable energy. They expect Japan to contribute trillions of yen in private and public money to that effort. In this way, they say, Asia’s coming energy transformation can be tied to Japan’s—and thereby the West’s.

Like America, Japan is hawkish, as it grasps the existential threat China poses. Over just a few years it has transformed its defence posture. However, unlike America but like all its neighbours, Japan is deeply reluctant to pick a fight with China. To lose would be the end of Japan as they know it, say officials; America, by contrast, could just go home. That reality, they add, helps Japan build trust with Asian countries fearful of being dragged into a great-power conflict.

But Japan also knows that, like itself, other Asian countries have no desire to be subordinated to China. Therefore, says a senior official, Japan’s help for these countries’ development is a mark of solidarity and a boost to their autonomy and independence. In Asia, the global West could yet spawn new members.■