The new Bangladesh is only half built

EIGHTEEN MONTHS have passed since a revolution in Bangladesh brought down the despotic Sheikh Hasina Wajed and her thuggish Awami League. On February 12th the country of 176m people will hold a general election, marking the return of democracy at last. It is a seminal moment: the first competitive vote in Bangladesh since 2008. For months observers have worried that violence would break out. So far, thankfully, they have been proved wrong.

The contest is largely a fight between two long-established parties, both of which were persecuted by the old regime One is Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest and most moderate of Bangladesh’s Islamist outfits. The other is the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led for years by the late Khaleda Zia, a former prime minister, and now fronted by her son, Tarique Rahman. The BNP is the favourite to win.

Many are rightly disappointed that Bangladesh’s upheaval has not empowered better, new parties with bold new agendas—Sheikh Hasina’s regime was execrable, but the politics that came before her was also grim. The Islamists who are about to win a lot of seats are almost certainly less tolerant than they are making out. And the BNP’s previous stints in power were marred by extreme corruption and worse. But Bangladesh’s progress should be weighed against its wretched state two years ago, and against well-founded fears that its caretaker government would fail to keep the peace. Given the long distance Bangladesh has had to travel, its achievements are big and worth celebrating.

The election will thrust the revolution into a new and risky phase. As a more conventional politics resumes, support from foreign friends may wane. Politicians tasting power for the first time in two decades might revert to the bad old ways. And Bangladesh will flourish only if it sustains its enthusiasm for reform. Whoever wins will have a lot to do.

The most urgent worry is the economy. The interim government—led by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel laureate—kept it from disaster. But big changes are needed. This year Bangladesh will graduate from a group of “least developed countries” that enjoy advantages in trade and concessionary loans. It needs to make its factories more efficient. It must increase government revenue, which is 7% of GDP, compared with 20% across Asia. And it needs to cut red tape and hammer corrupt bureaucrats who hold businesses to ransom.

Relations with India matter, too. Bangladeshis are right to resent how Sheikh Hasina has been backed by the government in Delhi. They are irked when Indian officials falsely paint Bangladesh as tainted by anti-Hindu rage. But the caretaker administration was too ready to needle India. The next government must reset ties.

The last task is political renewal at home. In an election-day referendum Bangladeshis will be asked about constitutional reforms aiming to cut the risk of fresh tyranny. They should back them, and the next government should see them into law—though the temptation to wriggle out will be strong. The new leaders also need to rehabilitate the Awami League, banned from politics by the interim government. That will be painful: the League has not taken responsibility for the deaths of some 1,400 people as Sheikh Hasina clung to power. But the new Bangladesh has to be built on forgiveness as well as justice.

Bangladeshis can be proud of their revolution, which offered encouragement to “Gen Z” protests in other parts of the world. This election is a welcome milestone. But the hard job of building a new Bangladesh has only just begun. ■