Ethiopia inches ever closer to war

The routine is familiar by now. Nervous queues outside banks running rapidly out of cash. Empty shelves, soaring prices, frantic hoarding of food. Over the past year residents of Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost region, have endured at least three similar episodes, terrified each time that another war would erupt. Hundreds of thousands of people are thought to have died during the last round of fighting between 2020 and 2022. Fears of a sequel are growing.

The most recent bout of tensions was the most ominous yet. On January 29th, following clashes between the Ethiopian army and forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Tigray’s ruling party, the Ethiopian government suspended all flights into and out of Tigray. Two days later government drones struck targets deep in central Tigray. Tadesse Werede, Tigray’s interim president, described the fighting as “something resembling an all-out war”.

That outcome appears to have been averted, for now. Mr Tadesse said his forces had withdrawn from some areas they had occupied over the weekend, stressing that “disagreements…can be resolved through dialogue”. On February 3rd flights to Tigray were allowed to resume.

Yet the risk of further violence remains uncomfortably high. In a speech to parliament on February 3rd Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, suggested that the TPLF was made up of “traitors” working to “dismantle Ethiopia”. “[The Ethiopian army] is mobilising in full force,” says a TPLF official. “I can’t tell you how scary this war is going to be if Abiy doesn’t stop what he is doing.”

The seeds of the present crisis were sown during the previous war. After taking office in 2018, Mr Abiy quickly gathered a coalition of forces with grievances against the TPLF, which he sought to displace as the dominant force in Ethiopian politics. His allies included ethno-nationalist militias from Ethiopia’s Amhara region. When war broke out in late 2020, Amhara militias seized and ethnically cleansed Western Tigray. Hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans were forced to flee their homes. Most have been wasting away in squalid camps in other parts of Tigray ever since.

A peace deal signed in 2022 was supposed to pave the way for further talks, which would allow the displaced to go home and ultimately resolve the territorial feud. But of the few thousand Tigrayans who returned in 2024, many faced intimidation and abuse from Amhara militias. Most of the others are too afraid to go home. Mr Abiy has stonewalled the TPLF’s demands to wrest control of the occupied territories from Amhara back to Tigray.

When TPLF forces unexpectedly crossed the Tekeze river into Tselemti last week (see map), officials claimed they wanted merely to remonstrate with the Ethiopian army about the mistreatment of returning Tigrayans. But some sources speculate that their real goal may have been to occupy strategic locations, or to probe the Ethiopian army’s defences.

Mr Abiy has long worried that the TPLF plans to take Western Tigray back by force, which would allow it to open a supply line to its allies in Sudan. His government appears to have interpreted the troops’ crossing as the prelude to a major offensive. The Ethiopian army is said to be moving large quantities of men and guns towards Tigray’s borders. Meanwhile fighting continues in southern Tigray between the TPLF and pro-government militias.

On January 30th the African Union (AU) publicly offered to mediate between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF. Ethiopia replied privately that the AU should stop meddling in its internal affairs, according to a source with first-hand knowledge of conversations between the two parties. Some in Mr Abiy’s circle may have concluded the time is ripe for firmer measures against the TPLF.

That does not mean war is imminent. Both sides have good reasons to be cautious. The TPLF has been weakened by years of infighting. Mr Abiy has many enemies—including neighbouring Eritrea, which has grown closer to the TPLF.

Yet Ethiopia’s crisis is also intertwined with the civil war in Sudan and the rivalries between the external powers that have been fuelling it. A new war in Tigray would probably spiral into a regional disaster. Those who can must push for peace while they still have time. ■