Why so many Colombians fight in foreign wars

A man in a tight camouflage shirt records a video for TikTok while walking past pickup trucks and dusty tents. Speaking in Spanish, he addresses his compatriotas, fellow Colombians: there is work waiting in Ukraine, and the pay is good. Within minutes of posting the clip, the comments start filling up. “Info”, writes one viewer. “Ex-army—how do I apply?” asks another.

Such videos have become commonplace. They are a window into a booming global market for armed labour that has pulled record numbers of Colombians into conflicts far from home. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, experts estimate that at least 3,000 Colombians have passed through the country, fighting on both sides, making them one of the largest foreign contingents. Others have turned up in Sudan’s civil war or have been recruited into Mexico’s violent gangs. Perhaps 10,000 Colombians are involved in foreign conflicts, estimates Mario Urueña-Sánchez, a security expert at Rosario University in Bogotá, the capital.

Most are former soldiers. Mr Urueña-Sánchez says they work within three broad categories. Security work—guarding compounds, convoys or energy installations for private firms—is the lowest paid. Doing the same for criminal organisations is more lucrative, but riskier. A third option is to fight abroad. That can mean enlisting in a foreign army or with private contractors.

Colombia’s veterans are in demand because they have experience from decades of fighting rebel groups like the FARC. Close military co-operation with the United States means many are familiar with NATO-standard weapons and communications systems. Not only do Colombians cost less than Westerners, but foreign forces can deploy them quickly, notes Elizabeth Dickinson of the International Crisis Group, a think-tank based in Brussels.

The supply of available fighters is growing. Colombia boasts South America’s second-largest army, after Brazil’s, with more than 260,000 active troops. It expanded sharply in the early 2000s, during the most intense phase of Colombia’s campaign against guerrilla groups; that cohort is now reaching retirement. Soldiers typically leave after two decades of service or upon turning 45. Officers passed over for promotion are forced out, too. The result is a steady stream of trained men leaving the armed forces at a relatively young age.

Unlike other countries with large veteran populations, such as the United States, Colombia has no comprehensive veterans’ policy to support the transition into civilian life, says Mr Urueña-Sánchez. Leaving the forces often means a sudden loss of housing, health care and institutional support. Few jobs reward military skills. Pensions are modest, typically around $400 a month. Foreign contracts promise to pay many times that amount.

Politics has not helped. Relations between President Gustavo Petro and the armed forces have been shaky since he took office in 2022. Colombia’s first left-wing president came to power promising to reform the security state. The fact that he is a former guerrilla has long made military figures wary of his intentions. His drive for a negotiation-led “total peace” with Colombia’s armed groups has been a frustrating failure. More than 13,000 soldiers have left the armed forces voluntarily since he became president.

The flow of fighters abroad has become a headache for Colombia. Most obviously, its citizens are taking serious risks. Some veterans sign up for what they believe is low-risk security work but find themselves on the front lines. Recruitment is often informal, conducted through social-media and messaging apps where claims about pay, insurance and conditions are invariably exaggerated. Language barriers and unfamiliar command structures complicate communication. The foreign ministry has said that scores of Colombians are being deceived by “sophisticated human-trafficking networks”.

Casualty rates are high. In Ukraine, Colombians are frequently deployed to a front line dominated by drones and heavy artillery—a battlefield very different from Colombia’s internal conflict, says Mr Urueña-Sánchez. Relatives of the deceased rarely get compensation. Insurance payments may be conditional on identifying and recovering a body, forcing families to travel to war zones and navigate foreign courts and bureaucracy.

Dangers have grown as recruitment has widened. Early waves of Colombian mercenaries were recruited in the early 2010s for the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through relatively professional channels. The UAE, short of mid-level officers, drew on retired Colombian commanders who brought experienced troops with them from their own networks. Today many recruits are dropouts, or even civilians, drawn in by online chatter that presents war as easy money.

Many return to Colombia with serious injuries or psychological trauma. Some drift from one conflict to the next, says Sean McFate, an ex-paratrooper now with the National Defence University in Washington. Other Colombians have been sent to Ukraine by criminal gangs to acquire combat skills, including in drone warfare, which are being used increasingly by armed groups in Colombia.

Officials also worry about diplomatic fallout. Colombians have been implicated in serious crimes abroad. In July 2021 about 20 Colombian nationals took part in the assassination of Haiti’s president, Jovenel Moïse. Colombia apologised to Sudan’s government last year after reports surfaced that at least 300 Colombians were fighting for the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s civil war. In December the United States imposed sanctions on a network accused of recruiting Colombian ex-soldiers for that conflict, where they were accused of training child soldiers.

Late last year the government ratified the United Nations’ anti-mercenary convention, aligning Colombia with international norms that criminalise those who recruit, finance or train mercenaries. But this will probably have little impact. Most countries that hire mercenaries have not signed the convention. Much of the trade runs through private firms that avoid the mercenary label by describing combat roles as “security” or “training”.

Meanwhile, demand for mercenaries is unlikely to ease. Conflicts linked to extractive industries—from gold to rare earths and energy—are rife in weak states, creating demand for military muscle.

Colombia could deal with its mercenary problem by implementing a veterans’ policy that offers better economic support, retraining and credible routes into civilian work, says Ms Dickinson. Without it, the draw of risky work abroad will persist, and foreign conflict will continue to offer what Colombia does not: work, pay and a sense of purpose. ■