How to think about new risks of nuclear proliferation

THE DANISH word hygge suggests a cosy state of relaxation that comes from open fires, woollen socks and hot chocolate. These days, though, some Nordic defence strategists think that only nuclear arms can provide inner peace. America’s allies Poland, Japan and South Korea are also considering whether they need weapons of their own.

Some have begun speaking about the need for a “Nordic nuke” to shield Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Others, such as Germany, are talking about co-operation with Europe’s nuclear powers, Britain and France. “As long as dangerous countries possess nuclear weapons,” said Ulf Kristersson, Sweden’s prime minister, last month, “sound democracies must also have access to nuclear weapons.” At the same time, as the New START treaty expires, America, China and Russia are on the brink of an arms race, violating the bargain that nuclear states would disarm, while non-nuclear states eschewed the bomb.

For almost eight decades a relatively stable nuclear order was underpinned by America’s promise to extend a nuclear shield to its allies. Whether it would make good on this pledge could never be known, prompting Charles de Gaulle, then president of France, to ask of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 whether he would be ready to “trade New York for Paris”. Yet American assurances and cajoling were enough to dissuade countries such as Sweden and Taiwan from joining the nuclear club.

Today that order is collapsing. Whereas proliferation used to be the business mainly of rogue states like Iran and North Korea, the talk today is coming from democracies. Some are motivated chiefly by the spectre of Russian aggression, aggravated by President Vladimir Putin’s threats to launch nuclear weapons against Ukraine. For others in Asia, the worry is China’s growing arsenal. All increasingly fear that it is unwise to bet their nation’s existence on America’s old promises.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on whether America would come to the aid of other members of NATO. American officials recently visiting Japan and South Korea have been noticeably reticent about the status of nuclear protection. Even under a new president who sought to restore faith in American nuclear deterrence, some allies may conclude that de Gaulle was right all along.

That poses a terrible dilemma. Some Western countries may feel compelled to possess weapons of their own. Yet their quest for individual security would be likely to trigger proliferation—even in countries that were initially leery of getting a bomb. And the more fingers hovering over doomsday triggers, the greater the chance of a catastrophic miscalculation or of a war turning radioactive.

Countries have time to think hard about these trade-offs, because a weapons programme might take years. The huge sums involved would divert spending from tanks and jets needed to fend off a conventional attack. Countries that dash for a bomb risk provoking adversaries determined to halt them while they are still vulnerable. Those considering joining the nuclear club could stop just short, creating a latent capacity that could be activated in an emergency. In Europe, Britain and France could work with their European allies to put up a nuclear umbrella. All should be thinking about establishing hotlines and other ways of preventing miscalculations and dampening crises.

Just to set out these arguments shows how dangerous the world is becoming. The temptation is to take comfort in nostalgia. But that only deepens the perils that lie ahead. ■