Two countries have changed their position about war with Iran

“We are locked and loaded and ready,” said Donald Trump on January 2nd, promising that America would come to the rescue of Iranians protesting against their regime. A month and many thousands of Iranian deaths later, the Middle East is still guessing if and when the American president may fulfil his promise.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has vowed to unleash a regional war if America launches air strikes. Initially few in the Middle East seemed eager for further conflict. The region’s power-brokers tried to dissuade America from military action. But attitudes now look more mixed.

Israel, America’s closest ally, at first opposed strikes on Iran. It feared that any attack would only be symbolic and could provoke Iran to launch missiles at Israel, before the Jewish state was prepared for another war. Binyamin Netanyahu, its prime minister and normally a hawk on Iran, was surprisingly reticent. “Revolutions are best done from within,” he told The Economist in January.

A month later Israel is urging America to attack. Its generals have flown to Washington to discuss strike plans. On February 3rd Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s envoy, met Mr Netanyahu, who tried to convince him that a deal with Iran was pointless.

Saudi Arabia’s position also seems to have become more nuanced. The kingdom initially cautioned America against strikes, saying that it would not allow American planes to use its air space. It would prefer America to hold fire but if it is going to attack, it at least wants to be part of the planning. On January 30th Prince Khalid bin Salman, the defence minister, is reported to have told American officials that if an attack does not happen “it will only embolden the [Iranian] regime.”

Several things explain the shifts in Israel. On the one hand, it is reassured by the sheer heft of America’s armed build-up in recent weeks. The arrival in the Arabian Sea of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft-carrier with its powerful air-wing and of additional fighter-jet squadrons deployed to bases in the region mean Mr Trump now has the option of ordering a sustained campaign of air strikes, rather than just a limited gesture of solidarity with Iran’s protesters. No less important, America has also sent air-defence batteries, giving further protection against the missiles and drones Iran can launch in retaliation.

On the other hand, it is nervous about the possible outcome of talks between Iran and America. During the height of the protests in January as it slaughtered its people, the Islamic Republic looked vulnerable. The Israelis and the Saudis worry that a deal, especially if it includes relief from the crippling American sanctions, could offer the regime in Tehran a lifeline.

It remains unclear what these talks may focus on. Past negotiations have centred on Iran’s nuclear programme, which was badly damaged during Israel’s and America’s 12-day war last June. Iran was once adamant it had a right to enrich uranium; it may be willing to make concessions on that. But its regime remains opposed to any talk of restrictions on its ballistic-missile programme or the funding of its proxy militias in the region. The Israelis and Saudis worry that, rather than taking advantage of Iran’s weakness to pursue a comprehensive deal, Mr Trump could let it off the hook with only nuclear restrictions.

They are not the only ones lobbying America. Turkey opposes any military intervention. It shares a 534km border with Iran and fears a war next door that could cause a wave of refugees. Its foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, is pushing the Americans to continue talks, advising them to “close the files one by one with Iran. Start with nuclear.”

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has embarked on a tour of the region, meeting the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If America follows the diplomatic route, Turkey will almost certainly be its main partner. But if America attacks Iran, Israel will almost certainly be involved.

The clout of the Turkish government has grown steadily since the revolution in Syria at the end of 2024. It has close ties with the new government there. Gallingly for Mr Netanyahu, Mr Trump credits Mr Erdogan with the downfall of the Assad regime, whereas Israel’s prime minister believes Israel’s attacks on Hizbullah, the Lebanese militia, precipitated Mr Assad’s ousting. Turkey, along with Qatar, is trying to broker a disarmament agreement for Hamas in Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, is deeply suspicious of Turkey’s motives and its ties to Hamas’s leadership.

None of this is happening in a vacuum. The region is still shuddering from the wars of the past two years. Mr Trump has upended things further. Alliances are shifting. In the aftermath of its military victories, Israel saw itself as the regional hegemon. Today Iran looks weaker than ever. Competition for influence is growing. A regional war would unleash chaos, but it would also create new opportunities. ■